Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 51 | Issue 1

2019

Elements of Its Own Demise: Key Flaws in the
Obama Administration's Domestic Approach to
the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Jamil N. Jaffer

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jamil N. Jaffer, Elements of Its Own Demise: Key Flaws in the Obama Administration's Domestic Approach to the Iran Nuclear Agreement, 51
Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 77 (2019)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol51/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019)

Elements of Its Own Demise: Key
Flaws in the Obama
Administration’s Domestic
Approach to the Iran Nuclear
Agreement
Jamil N. Jaffer *
CONTENTS
I.

Introduction .............................................................................77

II.

Background ...............................................................................79

III. Mistakes at Home: How the Obama Administration’s
Approach to Getting the Iran Deal Done Eased the
Path to the Trump Withdrawal ............................................. 87
A. What Kind of a Commitment Was the Iran Deal? ............................87
B. Why a Political Commitment?........................................................92
C. And What About the Sanctions?.....................................................96
IV. Lessons Learned ........................................................................99

I.

Introduction

A great deal of opprobrium has been levied at President Donald
Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal. 1 Many
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supporters of the deal have argued that the decision to leave the deal
undermines America’s credibility abroad, marking it as an itinerant
partner, and may even violate international law. 2 Contrary to this
popular view of the deal and its legal status, this paper argues that
early decisions made by the Obama Administration contributed to the
deal’s failure and led to the United States’ eventual withdrawal. For
one, the Obama Administration chose not to submit the agreement—
known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—to
Congress for ratification as a treaty nor did the Administration seek
to negotiate an ex post approval regime ahead of time. 3 Second, the
Obama Administration decided to enter into the agreement solely as a
“political commitment” between two sovereigns without even so much
as complying with the typical formalisms—like a signed document—
that are typically associated with sole executive agreements. 4 These
decisions, combined with Congress’s forced review of the agreement
and bipartisan majority votes against the deal—while ultimately not
binding at law—sapped the deal of its legitimacy and eased the path
for President Trump’s withdrawal. That is, if one is looking to
understand why the deal is no longer in place, one need look no
further than the way the deal was reached, the prior Administration’s
decision to ignore the clear domestic political opposition to the
agreement, and its concomitant effort to freeze Congress out of the
process. It was these decisions that planted the key seeds for the
deal’s ultimate demise.

1.

See Max Matza & Ritu Prasad, US Withdrawal Reverberates Across
World, BBC NEWS (May 8, 2018, 5:35 PM), https://www.bbc.com
/news/live/world-us-canada-44032008 [https://perma.cc/Z8YQ-AWYL].
(listing statements and reactions from individuals and organizations
across the world from President Trump’s actions).

2.

Richard Nephew & Ilan Goldenberg, Here’s What to Expect Now That
Trump Has Withdrawn From the Iran Nuclear Deal, the United States
Will Be Worst Off Once the Smoke Clears, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 9,
2018, 4:25 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/09/heres-what-toexpect-now-that-trump-has-withdrawn-from-the-iran-nuclear-deal/.
[https://perma.cc/6NYY-B888].

3.

Bret Stephens, Opinion, A Courageous Trump Call on a Lousy Iran
Deal, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/05/08/opinion/trump-courageous-iran-decision.html
[https://perma.cc/C4TE-CJTG].

4.

Jack Goldsmith, The Trump Administration Reaps What the Obama
Administration Sowed in the Iran Deal, LAWFARE (May 9, 2018, 9:29
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-Administration-reaps-whatobama-Administration-sowed-iran-deal [https://perma.cc/9VPA-TJVK].
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II. Background
At the outset, it is worth reviewing a bit of the history behind the
Iran nuclear agreement. Bilateral negotiations underlying the deal
between the United States and Iran began in secret in Oman in 2012.5
This followed the imposition of strict Congressional sanctions,
including the Central Bank of Iran secondary sanctions, which put a
significant amount of stress on the Iranian economy by forcing major
reductions in international oil purchases by putting purchasers under
threat of being cut off from the U.S. banking system. 6 The key
negotiations began to take further shape as they came into public
view in 2013, with the reentry of the P5+1 negotiating group—
composed of the permanent five members of the United Nations
Security Council (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia,
and China) plus Germany—into the U.S.-led negotiations. 7 The
negotiations nominally took place under the aegis of the P5+1
through 2015; in reality, however, the principal negotiations were
being conducted directly between the United States and Iran. 8 The
framework elements of the deal were initially announced on November
24, 2014, as part of the initial Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), which
was ultimately finalized and formalized in the JPCOA, announced on
July 14, 2015. 9
As the public negotiations progressed, it eventually became clear
to all involved, including Congress and the American public (and the
Iranian leadership), that the President and his team did not intend on
submitting the deal to Congress for its review or approval, whether as
treaty subject to Senate advice and consent, or otherwise. 10 In
5.

David Ignatius, The Omani ‘Back Channel’ to Iran and the Secrecy
Surrounding the Nuclear Deal, WASH. POST (June 7, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-omani-back-channel-toiran-and-the-secrecy-surrounding-the-nuclear-deal/2016/06/07/0b9e27d4
-2ce1-11e6-b5db-e9bc84a2c8e4_story.html?utm_term=.3d3817b030e1
[https://perma.cc/4PQV-VZWG].

6.

Protecting America from a Bad Deal: Ending U.S. Participation in the
Nuclear Agreement Hearing Before the Subcomm. On National Security
of Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 115th Cong. 115-84
(2018) (statement of Richard Goldberg, Senior Advisor, Foundation for
Defense of Democracies).

7.

Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION,
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-DiplomacyWith-Iran [https://perma.cc/HF3H-JHS6].

8.

Id.

9.

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, available at
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5KS8-ASHL] [hereinafter JCPOA].

10.

Matthew Weybrecht, State Department Affirms That Iran Deal is Only
a Political Commitment, LAWFARE (Nov. 28, 2015, 2:10 PM),
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addition, over time, it also became clear that the President did not
intend to seek additional authority from Congress to remove the
statutory and other sanctions imposed on Iran, but rather that he
intended to use his existing statutory waiver authority to implement
any sanction relief necessary under the agreement. 11 At times, the
President and his team indicated that Congress would have an
opportunity to weigh in on the deal, 12 however, as the deal was being
finalized, it became apparent this opportunity would come only at the
end of the deal itself, when, if Iran had fully complied, Congress
would take action to permanently remove its statutory sanctions on
Iran. 13
Notwithstanding the President’s determination to cede little, if
any, ground to Congress on the negotiations with Iran, Congress
nevertheless sought to influence the deal in a variety of ways. Senior
members of Congress introduced legislation that sought to provide
guidance to the executive branch on the aspects of an eventual
agreement that would be important to obtaining Congressional
support for a deal. 14 These same members of Congress also held
hearings and sought briefings to obtain information about the course
of the negotiations and to communicate their preferences directly to
the Administration. 15
https://www.lawfareblog.com/state-department-affirms-iran-deal-onlypolitical-commitment.
[https://perma.cc/QAL2-ZC9B];
see
also
Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran, supra note 7.
11.

Elena Chachko, Trump Withdraws from the Iran Nuclear Agreement:
What Comes Next, LAWFARE (May 8, 2018, 7:30 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-withdraws-iran-nuclear-agreementwhat-comes-next. [https://perma.cc/R9L8-UASG]

12.

Weybrecht, supra note 10.

13.

Natasha Turak, Iran Deal Won’t Survive Beyond May 2018, Sanctions
Expert Says, CNBC (Jan. 19, 2018, 8:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com
/2018/01/19/iran-deal-wont-survive-beyond-may-2018-sanctions-expertsays.html. [https://perma.cc/W47B-9WJA].

14.

Jonathan Weisman & Peter Baker, Obama Yields, Allowing Congress
Say on Iran Nuclear Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/15/us/senators-reach-deal-on-irannuclear-talks.html. [https://perma.cc/ZF2D-SBFS].

15.

See, e.g., Iran Nuclear Negotiations Act of 2014, S. 2650, 113th Cong.
(2014) (expanding sanctions imposed with respect to Iran and to impose
additional sanctions with respect to Iran, and for other purposes);
Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2013, S. 1881, 113th Cong. (2013)
(expanding sanctions imposed with respect to Iran and to impose
additional sanctions with respect to Iran, and for other purposes); Iran
Nuclear Compliance Act of 2013, S. 1765, 113th Cong. (2013) (ensuring
the compliance of Iran with agreements relating to Iran’s nuclear
program); and United States-Iran Nuclear Negotiations Act, H.R. 3292,
113th Cong. (2013) (preventing the Government of Iran from gaining a
nuclear weapons capability and to maximize the United States
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Following the announcement of the initial JPOA, while the final
agreement was being negotiated, it likewise became apparent to key
members of Congress that, not only did the President not intend to
submit the deal to Congress for its approval, but also that the
Administration might not even provide Congress with a copy of the
agreement at all, at least not prior to its implementation. 16 As a
result, while Congress could not reach a bipartisan agreement to stop
the President from making a deal with Iran, to require the President
to seek additional waivers from Congress, or to remove or condition
the President’s waiver authority on its approval, a strong bipartisan
consensus began building around the notion that Congress ought at
least get to see the deal ahead of time and ought have an opportunity
to act on the deal before it was implemented. 17
The result of these efforts was the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act of 2015 (INARA). 18 INARA, which initially drew a
strong veto threat from the White House, 19 eventually garnered
enough support amongst members of Congress that the
Administration not only withdrew its veto threat on the brink of an
initial vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but
ultimately allowed members of its own party to support the
legislation. 20 The legislation temporarily withdrew the President’s
waiver authority and required him to submit the JPCOA and related
materials to Congress. 21 Under INARA, the President was then
required to wait for a period of time to allow Congress to consider
and vote on resolutions of approval or disapproval on the deal before

diplomatic influence to achieve, consistent with the national security
interest of the United States and its allies and partners, a negotiated
settlement with the Government of Iran regarding Iran’s nuclear
weapons program).
16.

Karen DeYoung, Republican Investigation Finds That Obama
Administration Misled Congress on Possible Iranian Access to U.S.
Financial System: The State and Treasury Departments Were Willing to
Bend the Rules for the 2016 Transaction, Though it Never Went
LAW
(June
7,
2018,
6:40
PM),
Through,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberglaw. com/ms/document/P9Z5N13HBS3K&head
lineOnly=false [https://perma.cc/7TQZ-NGN8].

17.

See The Hill’s Whip List: Obama has 42 Senate votes for Iran Deal,
THE HILL (July 14, 2015, 7:56 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/flooraction/senate/247956-the-hills-whip-list-senators-take-sides-on-iran-deal.
[https://perma.cc/P37B-8GT4] (outlining each U.S. representative’s
opinions on the Iran Deal).

18.

H.R. 1191, 114th Cong. (2015).

19.

Weisman & Baker, supra note 14.

20.

Id.

21.

Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, 42 USC § 2160e(a)(1).
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he could implement any waivers of existing statutory sanctions. 22 The
bill eventually passed the Senate nearly unanimously (98-1) and
garnered a supermajority in the House of Representatives (400-25). 23
Following the passage of the INARA, Senator Tom Cotton (RAR), the one member of the Senate who voted against the INARA,
authored a letter, joined by 46 other U.S. Senators, to the Iranian
President, noting that any Iran deal not approved by Congress could
be revoked by the next President “with the stroke of a pen,” and that
“future Congresses could modify the terms of the agreement at any
time.” 24 This letter—widely panned by most foreign policy pundits
and claimed by some to run afoul of a rarely utilized (and almost
never enforced), century-old law 25—nonetheless served to convey the
deep concerns among many members of Congress about the process
by which the agreement was reached. 26 The letter also put Iran—and
the rest of the world community, including the P5+1—on notice that
a significant portion of the elected representatives of the American
people (at least in the upper house of Congress) were adamantly
opposed to the deal. 27
The President, having been forced to withdraw his veto threat,
signed the legislation and eventually provided the agreement along
with certain key documents to both Houses of Congress. 28 He also sent
22.

Id. at §2160e(b).

23.

Patricia Zengerle, U.S. House Passes Iran Nuclear Review Legislation,
REUTERS (May 14, 2015, 4:18 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usiran-nuclear-usa-idUSKBN0NZ29M20150514 [https://perma.cc/GG9RSTC6]; Lester Munson & Jamil Jaffer, Setting the Record Straight on
Congress’s Review of the Obama-Iran Nuclear Deal, NAT’L REV. (Nov.
17, 2016, 5:37 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com /2016/11/irannuclear-deal-congress-review-obama-deal-was-important-inara/
[https://perma.cc/CXS8-SFK2].

24.

Letter from Senate Republicans to the Leaders of Iran (Mar. 9, 2015),
available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/09/world/
middleeast/document-the-letter-senate-republicans-addressed-to-theleaders-of-iran.html [https://perma.cc/B82T-ZJ3Y].

25.

Jeremy Diamond, Did 47 Republican Senators Break the Law in Plain
Sight, CNN (Mar. 11, 2015, 11:21 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015
/03/10/politics/tom-cotton-iran-letter-logan-act/index.html.
[https://
perma.cc/M2KQ-K8U6].

26.

Id.

27.

Peter Baker, G.O.P. Senator’s Letter to Iran About Nuclear Deal
Angers White House, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes
.com/2015/03/10/world/asia/white-house-faults-gop-senators-letter-toirans-leaders.html [https://perma.cc/QV2U-8VBC].

28.

Kevin Liptak, Now That He Has A Deal with Iran, Obama Must Face
Congress, CNN (July 14, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/07/14/
politics/iran-nuclear-deal-congress-obama-block/index.html
[https://perma.cc/HB6B-TP8E].
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cabinet members and other senior national security officials to the Hill
to testify on the agreement and to provide both classified and
unclassified briefings to members. 29 In essence, having been forced to
cut Congress into the process at some level, the Administration
mounted a full-throated campaign, leveraging sympathetic outside
organizations, to put pressure on members of Congress to support the
deal—or at least not vote against it when the INARA-driven vote
came up. 30 Ultimately, resolutions on the deal were considered in
both Houses, and while the House voted against the deal with a
substantial 269-162 bipartisan majority, the Senate—while also
garnering a bipartisan 58 vote majority opposed to the deal—was
unable to overcome the 60 vote threshold needed to stop a legislative
filibuster of the disapproval resolution. 31 And neither chamber was
able to muster the supermajorities that would have been necessary to
survive the inevitable presidential veto of any disapproval
measure. 32 Thus, while INARA succeeded in forcing the President to
submit the deal to Congress and to pause on providing immediate
sanctions relief to Iran, 33 since Congress was unable to muster the
votes necessary to overcome a filibuster and an eventual veto,
following the end of the statutory review period mandated by the
legislation, President Obama’s waiver authority was restored and he
utilized it to provide the sanctions relief sought by Iran as part of the
deal. 34 Even more interesting, while the deal was pending review in
Congress, the Administration went to the U.N. Security Council and
obtained an ostensibly binding—at least under international law—
29.

Kristina Wong, Former Top Officials Urge Congress to Back Iran Deal,
THE HILL (July 20, 2015, 11:26 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/defense
/248483-former-top-us-officials-iran-deal-meets-key-objectives
[https://perma.cc/L4M9-WSNB].

30.

Id.

31.

See Cristina Marcos, House Rejects Obama’s Iran Deal, THE HILL (Sept.
11, 2015, 12:34 PM), https://thehill.com /blogs/floor-action/house
/253370-house-rejects-iran-deal [https://perma.cc/67FQ-GR35]; see also
Jennifer Steinhauer, Democrats Hand Victory to Obama on Iran
Nuclear Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/09/11/us/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-senate.html
[https://perma.cc/44VY-3284].

32.

Id.

33.

Stephen Dinan, Senate Forces Obama to Submit Iran Nuclear Deal for
Congressional Approval, WASH. TIMES (May 7, 2015), https://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/7/senate-forces-obama-submitnukes-deal-approval/ [https://perma.cc/E4GR-65ZP].

34.

Sabrina Siddiqui, Republican-Led Attempt to Block Iran Deal Fails in
Senate, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2015, 4:13 PM), https://www.
theguardian.com/us-news/2015/sep/10/iran-nuclear-deal-senate-day-ofdecision [https://perma.cc/9U2G-EX8U].
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Security Council Resolution requiring states to comply with certain
provisions of the deal. 35
And that was where things stood on the eve of the November
2016 Presidential election when, against nearly every poll (and
perhaps against all odds), Donald Trump became the President of the
United States. Then-President-Elect Trump, who—like nearly every
other Republican candidate during the primaries—had made
opposition to the Iran nuclear deal a centerpiece of his foreign policy
platform during the general election campaign, 36 once again made
clear that he remained steadfastly opposed to the deal and that he
intended to do away with it upon entering office. 37 And yet through
the first year of his presidency, despite near-unanimous opposition to
the deal amongst the Republican members of Congress, 38 and multiple
opportunities to cease providing sanctions relief to Iran, 39 even
President Trump kept the Iran deal alive. 40 Much of the pressure to
keep the deal alive came from outside the Administration, from third
party groups who supported the deal and former Obama

35.

See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Adopting
Resolution 2231 (2015), Endorses Joint Comprehensive Agreement on
Iran’s Nuclear Programme, U.N. Press Release SC/11974 (July 20,
2015); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential
Control Over International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1203, 1242 (2018)
(noting that while the Administration did seek a UN Resolution, the
resolution did not mandate the end of U.S. sanctions).

36.

See, e.g., Yeganeh Torbati, Trump Election Puts Iran Nuclear Deal on
Shaky Ground, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2016, 7:16 AM), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-iran/trump-election-puts-irannuclear-deal-on-shaky-ground-idUSKBN13427E [https://perma.cc/9R77GNDZ] (“A businessman-turned-politician who has never held public
office, Trump called the nuclear pact a ‘disaster’ and ‘the worst deal
ever negotiated’ during his campaign and said it could lead to a ‘nuclear
holocaust.’ In a speech to the pro-Israel lobby group AIPAC in March,
Trump declared that his ‘Number-One priority’ would be to ‘dismantle
the disastrous deal with Iran.’”).

37.

Id.

38.

Kevin Liptak & Nicole Gaouette, Trump Withdraws from Iran Nuclear
Deal, Isolating Him Further From World, CNN (May 9, 2018, 1:51
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/08/politics/donald-trump-irandeal-announcement-decision/index.html.
[https://perma.cc/66VJLWUW].

39.

Trump Administration to Reinstate All Iran Sanctions, BBC NEWS
(Nov. 3, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-us-canada-46071747
[https://perma.cc/D824-9FNH].

40.

Brian Naylor & Ayesha Rascoe, Trump: U.S. ‘Will Withdraw’ From
Iran Nuclear Deal, NPR (May 8, 2018, 2:32 PM), https://www.
npr.org/2018/05/08/609383603/trump-u-s-will-withdraw-from-irannuclear-deal [https://perma.cc/6JUD-JP72].
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Administration officials, 41 as well as the United States’ international
partners, primarily the other P5+1 nations, who argued that the Iran
deal, while perhaps not perfect, had largely been complied with and
had successfully kept Iran at least some distance from a viable nuclear
breakout capability. 42
While these arguments enjoyed some amount of resonance
amongst staff and some key leaders in the Trump Administration, the
President himself remained significantly skeptical. 43 Outside groups
looking at the deal argued that there were key aspects of Iranian
noncompliance that had gone ignored by the prior Administration, as
well as that fatal flaws in the deal which prevented it from truly being
an effective bulwark against an Iranian nuclear capability. 44 For these
groups, at least, the Iran deal actually made the situation worse as it:
(i) pulled the rug out from under an extremely effective, maximumpressure sanctions policy; (ii) overturned decades-long U.S. nonproliferation policies, including opposing domestic uranium
enrichment capabilities; and (iii) permitted Iran to escape
accountability for its past nuclear weapons-related activities 45
(including employing a testing regime for former suspected weapons
sites that would have made a Russian Olympic athlete proud).
Moreover, for the individuals and groups opposed to the deal, the
late-breaking decision by the Obama Administration to permit Iran to
continue to develop its ballistic missile capabilities (and therefore its

41.

Rick Gladstone, 76 Experts Urge Donald Trump to Keep Iran Deal,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
11/15/world/middleeast/trump-iran-deal.html [https://perma.cc/H4YJJGNY].

42.

Steve Holland & David Ljunggren, U.S. Allies Press Trump to Keep
Iran Nuclear Deal Alive, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2018, 12:05 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear/u-s-allies-press-trumpto-keep-iran-nuclear-deal-alive-idUSKBN1HU28R
[https://perma.cc/599B-DZY7].

43.

Peter Baker, Trump Recertifies Iran Nuclear Deal, but Only
Reluctantly, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/07/17/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-recertify.html
[https://perma.cc/8T6W-VHES].

44.

TZVI KAHN, FOUNDATION
IRAN’S COMPLIANCE WITH
1-2, 5-6 (2017).

45.

Michael R. Gordon & David E. Sanger, Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear
Program; Limits on Fuel Would Lessen with Time, N.Y. TIMES (July 14,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/irannuclear-deal-is-reached-after-long-negotiations.html?module=inline
[https://perma.cc/L95G-ZD5P].

FOR
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nuclear weapons delivery capability), reversing a long-standing U.N.
policy on ballistic missile launch by Iran, 46 was particularly galling.
Nonetheless, at least for the bulk of the first year, the President’s
advisors who favored the deal were able to stave off Presidential
action by seeking to work with Congress and the P5+1 nations to
modify the deal without the United States backing out and
reinstituting sanctions. 47 Not surprisingly, with little leverage on its
international partners and Congress, and even less with Iran, this
Administration effort was unsuccessful, and the issue came to a head
in 2018. At that point, the President, having given in to pressure
from his advisors on multiple occasions, and having sought alternative
efforts to improve the deal through work with Congress and the P5+1
partners, ultimately decided to use the mechanism provided under
INARA. 48 He first declined to certify Iran’s compliance with the
deal, 49 then eventually stopped issuing the Obama-era waivers that
kept the deal in place. 50 Thus, as of early November 2018, two years
after his election, President Trump reinstituted the full scope of
American sanctions against Iran, including the crushing secondary
CBI sanctions that had pushed Iran to the negotiating table six years
earlier. 51
While it remains to be seen whether the reinstitution of strict
sanctions on Iran will once again force the regime back to the table to
negotiate the “better deal” that President Trump and his foreign
policy team has indicated they seek, this episode can perhaps provide
future Administrations some critical lessons about the permanence
and political stability of international agreements they enter into.
46.

Eyder Peralta, The Latest On Iran Deal: Obama Says Deal Provides
New
Way
Forward,
NPR
(July
14,
2015,
6:41
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/07/14/422809249/thelatest-on-iran-deal-obama-to-deliver-speech-from-white-house
[https://perma.cc/DT28-E7RH].

47.

Colin Kahl, The Myth of a ‘Better’ Iran Deal, FOREIGN POLICY (Sept.
26, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/ 09/26/the-myth-of-a-betteriran-deal/ [https://perma.cc/GYU5-BTG6].

48.

Id.

49.

Adam Edelman, Trump Threatens to Cancel Iran Nuclear Deal If It’s
Not Strengthened, NBC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.nbcnews
.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-puts-iran-nuclear-deal-handscongress-n810366. [https://perma.cc/RBD2-DJQ8].

50.

Mark Landler, Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned,
N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08
/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html
[https://perma.cc/H3MJ-D35D].

51.

Michelle Linderman et al., United States Reinstates Full Iran Embargo,
CROWELL & MORING (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.cmtradelaw.
com/category/iran-sanctions/ [http://perma.cc/QAU6-G5BA].
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III. Mistakes at Home: How the Obama
Administration’s Approach to Getting the Iran Deal
Done Eased the Path to the Trump Withdrawal
A.

What Kind of a Commitment Was the Iran Deal?

The first question often litigated by proponents and opponents of
the Iran nuclear deal is exactly what type of agreement it was and
whether it should have been something else (or at least have been
treated as such). 52
There are five primary types of binding
agreements between nation-states under international law: treaties, ex
ante congressional-executive agreements, ex post congressionalexecutive agreements, executive agreements made pursuant to an
existing treaty, and sole executive agreements. 53 In addition, states
often enter into certain agreements that are not classically binding—
either domestically or internationally: the so-called political
commitment. 54
While scholars have noted that such political
commitments have a questionable constitutional pedigree, including
lacking stable grounding in any founding era understandings, 55 the
historical record indicates that fairly soon after the birth of the
nation, the U.S. government began entering into such informal

52.

Gordon & Sanger, supra note 45.

53.

Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1207-08.

54.

See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis & Joshua J. Newcomer, ”Political”
Commitments and the Constitution, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 507, 516 (2009)
(defining political commitments as “a nonlegally binding agreement
between two or more nation-states in which the parties intend to
establish commitments of an exclusively political or moral nature”); see
id. at 519-20 & n. 42 (quoting the State Department’s position—
expressed in a transmittal document accompanying the START Treaty
in 19991—that “[a] ‘political’ undertaking is not governed by
international law . . . . Until and unless a party extricates itself from its
‘political undertaking,’ which it may do without legal penalty, it has
given a promise to honor that commitment, and the other Party has
every reason to be concerned about compliance with such undertakings.
If a Party contravenes a political commitment, it will be subject to an
appropriate political response.”); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 35, at 1218 (“A political commitment is an agreement, usually
written, between the President or one of the President’s subordinates
and a foreign nation or foreign agency. Its defining characteristic is that
it imposes no obligation under international law and a nation incurs no
state responsibility for its violation. As a result, a successor President is
not bound by a previous President’s political commitment under either
domestic or international law and can thus legally disregard it at will.”);
Michael D. Ramsey, Evading the Treaty Power?: The Constitutionality
of Nonbinding Agreements, 11 FIU L. REV. 371, 374–76 (2016).

55.

Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 54, at 512-513.
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agreements. 56 According to Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack
Goldsmith, since the founding era, “Presidents have asserted the
authority to make a political commitment on practically any topic
without authorization from Congress or the Senate, and without any
obligation to even inform Congress about the commitment, as long as
the commitment does not violate extant federal law.” 57 While there
may have been some debate within the Obama Administration on
whether the deal ought be entered into as a sole executive agreement
early on, after the deal was reached, the Administration made clear
that it had entered into the agreement as an unsigned, non-binding
“political commitment.” 58
As a result, much of the debate since then has turned on whether,
in fact, the Administration (and Congress) should have handled the
deal differently. Some opponents of the deal suggest that Congress
actually did the nation a disservice by not forcing the President to
submit the deal as a treaty, and have argued—perhaps in contrast to
the most common-sense understanding of INARA—that by passing
legislation that required the deal to be submitted to Congress (and
ultimately voting to oppose the deal by bipartisan margins in both
Houses), Congress was actually complicit in making the deal lawful.59
56.

Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1207 (“There is no evidence
that the Founders discussed the possibility that the U.S. government
would make international agreements through any process other than
the treaty process. Nonetheless, beginning in the 1790s, the U.S.
government began to make some international agreements through
mechanisms other than the one described in Article II, although for a
long time Article II treaties were still the dominant mode of agreement
making.”); id. at 1218 (“The constitutional basis for a political
commitment is unclear, but it appears to be closely related to the
President’s power to conduct diplomacy, since at bottom a political
commitment is like diplomatic speech backed by a personal pledge of the
executive official who made it.”).

57.

Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1207.

58.

See Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Sec’y for Leg. Affairs, U.S.
Dep’t of State, to Mike Pompeo, U.S. Representative, U.S. Congress
(Nov. 19, 2015), available at http://www.humanrightsvoices.org
/assets/attachments/documents/11.24.2015.state.dept.letter.jcpoa.pdf
(“The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not a treaty or
an executive agreement, and is not a signed document. The JCPOA
reflects political commitments between Iran, the P5+1 (the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China), and the
European Union. As you know, the United States has a long-standing
practice of addressing sensitive problems in negotiations that culminate
in political commitments.”).

59.

Andrew C. McCarthy, Distorting the Iran-Deal Bill, NAT’L REV. (Nov.
19, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/11/obamairan-deal-corker-bill/[https://perma.cc/PJM6-YU94]; see also Andrew
McCarthy, The Corker Bill Isn’t a Victory — It’s a Constitutional
REV.
(Apr.
18,
2015),
https://www.
Perversion,
NAT’L
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Interestingly—in perhaps a paradigmatic situation of tough cases
making for strange bedfellows—supporters of the Iran deal have
likewise argued that Congress’s action effectively added to the
President’s legal authorities. 60
The reality, of course, is that Congress was completely
uninterested in assisting the President with the Iran deal. To the
contrary, as became clear later in the process, bipartisan majorities
(including key players in President Obama’s own party like Senators
Chuck Schumer and Bob Menendez) were steadfastly opposed to the
deal. 61 Thus, the notion that, somehow, those who were fervently
opposed to the deal actually sought to expedite its path or strengthen
the President’s hand, simply makes no sense. Indeed, as Professors
Samuel Estreicher and Steven Menashi point out, the text of INARA
clearly suggests that Congress “thought it was being unfairly sidelined
from Iran policy and desperately wanted to reclaim some role in the
process.” 62 Estreicher and Menashi also correctly point out that,
rather than authorizing unilateral executive action, INARA actually
sought to restore significant congressional participation in the
executive process related to the deal. 63
And, as Bradley and
Goldsmith accurately recognize, contrary to shepherding the deal
through, the INARA successfully forced the President to submit the
deal and its underlying materials to Congress and “spark[ed] an
extensive national debate on the deal that forced the Obama
Administration to explain and justify the Iran deal like it had not
before.” 64 Perhaps even more importantly, INARA also put members
of Congress on the record—whether for or against the deal. 65

nationalreview.com/2015/04/corker-bill-isnt-victory-its-constitutionalperversion-andrew-c-mccarthy/ [https://perma.cc/77HR-Y62W].
60.

See Harold Hongju Koh, Triptych’s End: A Better Framework to
Evaluate 21st Century International Lawmaking, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM
338, 354-55 (2017) (“The only new piece of legislation enacted in
response to the JCPOA, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
(‘Corker/Cardin’ bill), does not undermine the President’s legal
authorities; if anything, it added to them.”).

61.

Burgess Everett, Menendez, Schumer May Not Matter Much On Iran,
(Aug.
18,
2015
6:09
PM),
POLITICO
https://www.politico.com/story/2015/08/iran-deal-robert-menendezchuck-schumer-121501 [http://perma.cc /KP4X-XEZW].

62.

Samuel Estreicher & Steven Menashi, Taking Steel Seizure Seriously:
The Iran Nuclear Agreement and the Separation of Powers, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 1199, 1243 (2017).

63.

Id.

64.

Id. at 1296.

65.

Id.
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With respect to the question whether the agreement was properly
conceived as a non-binding political commitment, Estreicher and
Menashi argue that there are good reasons not to take the prior
Administration’s position at face value. 66 For example, they note that
the agreement “simultaneously describes its provisions as voluntary
and obligatory” and seeks to bind future Administrations to treating
the waiver of sanctions under the deal “as an ongoing obligation of
the United States.” 67 Professor Michael Ramsey likewise notes that
while “[i]n many respects [the JPCOA] has the character of a
nonbinding agreement” it also has key aspects that “suggest[] a
binding commitment,” including that “[i]t is very specific with respect
to the sanctions relief the United States undertakes to provide and
very specific as to the timetable.” 68 Professor Ramsey also notes that
“it is uncertain whether the U.S. negotiators made clear to the other
parties that the agreement was nonbinding” and that “[s]ome
statements by Iranian officials indicate the contrary.” 69
Not surprisingly, supporters of the Iran deal take a different view.
Harold Hongju Koh, the former legal advisor to the State Department
in the Obama Administration, argues that the JCPOA is purely a
“political…commitment in both form and substance” in that “[o]n
matters of substance, the parties went out of their way to style the
obligations as ‘voluntary’—things they ‘will do’ (not ‘shall do’)—and
carefully avoided all the procedural trappings of a binding
convention.” 70
Of course, the proof is in the agreement itself. And when one
turns to the agreement, it seems that Estreicher, Menashi, and
Ramsey have the better of the argument. While the agreement is
nominally political, in that it is unsigned, it also makes clear that the
breach of its terms relieves the other parties of their obligation to
comply. 71 Likewise, given that the agreement itself purports to
commit the United States to a fifteen-year course of action wherein, if
Iran complies, sanctions must regularly be waived every 90-to-180

66.

Estreicher & Menashi, supra note 62, at 1203-4.

67.

Id. at 1203.

68.

Michael D. Ramsey, Evading the Treaty Power?: The Constitutionality
of Nonbinding Agreements, 11 FIU L. REV. 371, 378–9 (2016).

69.

Id. at 379.

70.

Koh, supra note 60, at 353.

71.

See Chris Bushell & Sam Waudby, An Unsigned Agreement Can Still
Bind The Parties, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Apr. 10, 2015 9:51 AM),
https://hsfnotes.com/litigation/2015/04/10/an-unsigned-agreement-canstill-bind-the-parties/ [https://perma.cc/T57E-ZFZT] (discussing the
implications of breaching an unsigned agreement); see also Letter from
Julia Frifield, supra note 58.
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days, over the course of at least five separate presidential terms. 72
Given these provisions, it is hard to understand how any future
President might view the agreement as anything other than an
attempt to bind him or her to its terms in the long-run.
Even if we take the prior Administration’s position at face-value
that they sought to put in place a political commitment in, it is worth
assessing whether they succeeded in doing so. Professor Ramsey has
argued that for political commitments to be considered legitimate,
they ought meet certain constitutional requirements, such that they
don’t “erode the protections of the treaty-making clause”:
First, nonbinding agreements…should have no domestic legal
effect in U.S. courts nor impose any legal obligations on U.S.
domestic entities…[] Second, the President...must [en]sure that a
purportedly nonbinding agreement is clearly and unequivocally
nonbinding under international law….[] Third, a nonbinding
agreement [cannot] constrain future Presidents (even
informally)…Thus, a nonbinding agreement cannot be
understood as imposing constraints on policymakers within the
U.S. domestic legal or political system and it cannot be
represented to foreign parties as imposing any constraints on
U.S. policymakers in the international legal or political system. 73

Professor Ramsey further argues that an additional limitation is
worth considering: ensuring that nonbinding agreements not make
“specific commitment[s] on behalf of the United States which the
current U.S. President cannot fulfill” because such future
commitments “might create expectations and reliance by the other
party, and thus implicate the policies of the treaty-making clause.” 74
In at least three respects, the JCPOA runs afoul of Professor
Ramsey’s criteria. First, the JCPOA clearly seeks to impose some
measure of constraints on U.S. policymakers within our domestic
political system, in that it required the issuance of waivers on a goingforward basis during the then-current Administration. 75 Second, the
Obama Administration’s decision to go to the U.N. Security Council
for a formal resolution, also sought to impose constraints on U.S.
policymakers in both the international legal and political systems, in
that it bound the United States, like all other member states, to
comply with certain of the JCPOA’s provisions (albeit not the
requirement to lift U.S. sanctions). 76 Third, the JPCOA makes
72.

JCPOA, supra note 9.

73.

Ramsey, supra note 68, at 375-6.

74.

Id. at 376-77.

75.

Id. at 379.

76.

See Press Release, supra note 35.
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commitments that then-current President cannot fulfill, in that it
purports to commit future Presidents—like the current President in
this instance—to continue issuing the same waivers that the prior
President used to effectuate the Iran deal. 77
Moreover, as Professors Bradley and Goldsmith point out,
regardless whether such agreements are formally binding, “[i]n
practice…the actions of an earlier President affect and narrow the
options of a later President.” 78 And indeed, that is exactly what
happened here. Even though President Trump came into office
adamantly opposed to the Iran nuclear deal—the very “status quo
bias and bureaucratic inertia” that Bradley and Goldsmith highlight,
accompanied by concerns about upsetting the ongoing allied efforts to
reintegrate Iran into the global economy—hampered the President
from implementing his preferred policy of getting rid of the Iran deal
for over the first year-and-a-half of his Administration. 79
B.

Why a Political Commitment?

In assessing the impact of the prior Administration’s decision to
use a political commitment-style vehicle for the JCPOA, it may be
valuable to understand why it went down that road rather than
entering into a treaty or another form of binding international
agreement. At a minimum, it is clear, as Estreicher and Menashi note,
that at least one key factor in the decision was the fact that the
“President could not proceed...by treaty because majorities in both
houses of Congress opposed the pact.” 80 This fact, highlighted by the
votes required by INARA, made clear that the Administration simply
did not have the votes it would have needed to get a congressionalexecutive agreement in place, much less the supermajority of votes
needed to obtain the Senate’s advice and consent to a treaty.81
Indeed, Secretary John Kerry—in a moment of candor before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee—admitted as much, arguing that
the Administration had treated the JPCOA as a political commitment
specifically because they didn’t think they could get it through the
Senate as a treaty. 82 And while Secretary Kerry argued at that

77.

Ramsey, supra note 68, at 380.

78.

Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1253-54.

79.

Id. at 1254.

80.

Estreicher & Menashi, supra note 62, at 1202.

81.

Id.

82.

See Iran Nuclear Agreement: The Administration’s Case, Hearing
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 114th Cong. 83 (2015)
(testimony of Secretary Kerry responding to a question from Rep.
Ribble: ”I spent quite a few years ago trying to get a lot of treaties
through the United States Senate. Frankly, it’s become physically
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hearing that treaties had generally become “impossible” to get
through the Senate, 83 as the immediate past Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, he had to be aware that between 2009
and 2014, the Senate had given its advice and consent to 13 treaties
submitted by the Obama Administration, including the controversial
New START Treaty. 84
impossible…you can’t pass a treaty anymore…It’s become impossible to
pass.”).
83.

Id.

84.

See id.; Convention on the Conservation and Management of High
Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean, Nov. 14, 2009, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 113-1, available at https://www.congress.gov/treatydocument/113th-congress/1/resolution-text?r=26&s=1
[https://perma.cc/3ZWS-DEEJ]; Amendment to the Convention on
Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries,
Sept. 28, 2007. S. Treaty Doc. No. 113-3, available at
https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/113thcongress/3/resolution-text?r=24&s=1 [https://perma.cc/FJY2-PQM8];
Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, Nov. 22, 2009, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 112-4, available at
https://www.congress.gov/treatydocument/112th-congress/4/resolution-text
[https://perma.cc/MP48Y38H]; Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Bermuda, Jan. 12, 2009, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 111-6, available at https://www.congress.gov/treatydocument/111th-congress/6/resolution-text?r=37&s=1
[https://perma.cc/ZF87-88WM]; Investment Treaty with Rwanda, Feb.
19,
2008,
S.
Treaty
Doc.
No.
110-23,
available
at
https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/110thcongress/23/resolution-text [https://perma.cc/WQ3B-C4WQ]; Treaty
with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, Apr. 8, 2010, S. Treaty Doc. No. 111-5,
available
at
https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/111thcongress/5/resolution-text [https://perma.cc/K8XC-3324]; Treaty with
United Kingdom Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, June 21-26,
2007,
S.
Treaty
Doc.
No.
110-7,
available
at
https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/110thcongress/7/resolution-text [https://perma.cc/38CR-RR9U]; Treaty with
Australia Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, Sept. 5, 2007, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 110-10, available at https://www.congress.gov/treatydocument/110th-congress/10?r=56&s=1
[https://perma.cc/RLE69T2V]; Hague Convention on International Recovery of Child Support
and Family Maintenance, Nov. 23, 2007, S. Treaty Doc. No. 110-21,
available
at
https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/110thcongress/21/resolution-text?r=26 [https://perma.cc/B7AD-JDWH]; Tax
Convention with Malta, Aug. 8, 2008, S. Treaty Doc. No. 111-1,
available
at
https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/111thcongress/1/resolution-text?r=21
[https://perma.cc/P4XN-XQ5G];
Protocol Amending Tax Convention with New Zealand, Dec. 1, 2008, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 111-3, available at https://www.congress.gov/treatydocument/111th-congress/3/resolution-text
[https://perma.cc/UV2KGJ22]; Treaty Doc. 111-4, Protocol Amending Tax Convention with
France, Jan. 13, 2009, S. Treaty Doc. No. 111-4, available at
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Moreover, the prior Administration’s approach to the JCPOA was
not a mere flash in the pan, but rather was reflective of a larger trend
of the Administration eschewing treaties in favor of more Executivefriendly approaches. For example, Professors Goldsmith and Bradley
point out that while the overall trend of treaty submission has been
on a downward slope in prior Administrations for structural reasons,
the Obama Administration had historically low numbers in the
average number of treaties transmitted per presidential year—4.75—
as compared to the modern post-Truman average of 15.3 per year.85
This is not to suggest that Secretary Kerry was incorrect when he
assessed that the Administration would face an uphill battle in the
Senate if it were to have submitted the JPCOA as a treaty, after all,
his vote count correctly previewed the majority bipartisan opposition
demonstrated by the INARA deal votes. 86 And, to be fair, Secretary
Kerry was also right that as a general matter, the Obama
Administration faced a tougher treaty approval regime than prior
Administrations; as Goldsmith and Bradley point out, the prior
Administration’s treaty approval rate was substantially lower—39%
versus 92% historically—suggesting that politics also likely played a
key role. 87
Given all this, one can perhaps understand why the
Administration eschewed the treaty mechanism and sought to go
down the political commitment road in the case of the JCPOA. But
the next question that must be considered is whether there is a
historical basis for entering into an agreement like the JCPOA
through the mechanism of an unsigned, non-binding political
commitment. And on that front, the Administration doesn’t fare
quite well either. At least one academic piece to examine the
https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/111thcongress/4/resolution-text?r=20 [https://perma.cc/LK5H-DT35].
85.

Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1210-11.

86.

Munson & Jaffer, supra note 23.

87.

Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1211; see also David S. Jonas &
Dyllan M. Taxman, JCP-No-Way: A Critique of the Iran Nuclear Deal
as A Non-Legally-Binding Political Commitment, 9 J. NAT’L SECURITY
L. & POL’Y 589, 595-96 (2018) (noting that “the Senate has actually
been a friend to the President in international agreement-making: it has
rarely denied advice and consent…and its partisan identity has not been
indicative of its ability to pass important arms control and
nonproliferation agreements”). Indeed, according to Jonas and Taxman,
the Senate has repeatedly expressed its preference for treaties in the
arms control area by consistently granting its advice and consent—at a
“near-perfect rate”—to such agreements. Id. at 602-03. According to
them, the Senate’s overall rejection rate for treaties is below two
percent, and even accounting for treaties that are left to lie fallow,
between 1949-2000, under eight percent of treaties failed to receive the
Senate’s advice and consent. Id. at 603.
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question closely has made the strong argument that the JPCOA is
“the only highly significant nonproliferation agreement to be
negotiated as an unsigned non-binding political commitment in
modern American history.” 88
In examining the historical pedigree of arms control agreements,
Professor David Jonas and Dyllan Taxman compiled what they argue
is a comprehensive list of the most significant international arms
control and nuclear nonproliferation agreements involving the United
States. 89 According to Jonas and Taxman, 79% of these agreements
have been classic Article II treaties, 95% have been binding at
international law, and all of these agreements, save the JCPOA, were
signed. 90 Moreover, Jonas and Taxman note that the significant
majority of multilateral agreements of all varieties—of which the
JCPOA is one—are entered into as Article II treaties (between 6075%). 91 Indeed, according to their analysis, only one multilateral
arms-control agreement other than the JCPOA has ever been entered
into outside the treaty process. 92 This all, of course, bears significant
note because, if Jonas and Taxman have it right, the JCPOA is a
significant deviation from the norm of nonproliferation and arms
control agreements across a variety of factors—even when it comes to
non-binding political commitments which are, themselves, quite rare
in this arena. 93
Jonas and Taxman also note that some of the obvious reasons
that Presidents use treaties as the primary vehicles for major
international arms control agreements is that successful completion of
88.

Jonas & Taxman, supra note 87, at 590.

89.

Id. at 596 (“The authors have compiled, in an Appendix to this article,
a comprehensive list of the most significant arms control and nuclear
nonproliferation agreements to which the United States has been party
or participant.”).

90.

Id. (“The Appendix spans nearly 100 years of U.S. treaty history and
includes 58 national security agreements, 57 of which deal directly and
specifically with arms control or nuclear nonproliferation. Of the 57
most significant nuclear- or arms control-specific agreements into which
the United States has entered, 45 have been Article II treaties (79%)-these agreements are listed in the first segment of the Appendix; 54
have been legally binding international law treaties (95%)-these agreements comprise the first and second sections of the
Appendix; of the 58 agreements, all but the Iran Nuclear Deal are
signed.”).

91.

Id. at 598.

92.

Id.

93.

See id. at 595 (“Non-binding political commitments in arms control and
nonproliferation are scarce, and significant landscape-altering political
commitments in the nonproliferation and arms control arenas are almost
non-existent outside of the Iran Nuclear Deal.”).
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the treaty process demonstrates deep public (and elite) support and
provides foreign governments—who understand the significant
expenditure of political capital required to obtain Senate consent—
with assurance that the deal will likely have relative permanence.94
Indeed, the authors argue that the value of treaties is even more
significant in cases—like here—where there is limited trust between
the parties. 95 For example, the Soviet Union repeatedly pressed the
United States to submit arms control agreements as treaties,
including SALT II in the Carter Administration (which was never
ratified due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which caused Carter
to pull the treaty from the Senate) and SORT in the Bush 43
Administration (which was ratified 95-0 in the US Senate and was in
effect from 2003-2011). 96
Contrary to this historical trend with respect to arms control
agreements, however, the prior Administration chose to implement
the Iran nuclear agreement as a political commitment. In doing so,
Bradley and Goldsmith argue that the Administration essentially
“established a new form of unilateral international lawmaking,” by
creating an international agreement that relied inherently upon
existing statutory authority delegated to the executive branch.97
That the Administration was able to do so and essentially ignore the
fact that bipartisan majorities in both houses opposed the agreement
was, in the view of these scholars, a “significant constitutional
innovation” that “vastly expand[ed] the President’s power to make
and implement international agreements (albeit nonbinding ones).” 98
C. And What About the Sanctions?

One final question that may be worth considering is why the prior
Administration sought to unilaterally use its existing statutory waiver
authority, rather than going back to Congress for clear authority to
implement the deal. Interestingly, Europe chose a different path. As
94.

Id. at 597-98 (“Scholars have noted that foreign leaders prefer Article II
treaties and are aware of the political capital required of a U.S.
President to acquire a two-thirds Senate majority making it highly
unlikely that the United States will renege on an agreement….The
widespread support for an agreement demonstrated by the Article II
process has a spiraling effect on its perceived longevity: the President’s
predecessors are less likely to back out when support is high; legislators
are less likely to pass laws inconsistent with the treaty, putting the U.S.
in breach; and foreign heads of state are less likely to resist execution or
withdraw knowing that the President, the legislature, their predecessors,
and the American people stand behind the agreement.”); id. at 602.

95.

Id. at 602.

96.

Id.

97.

Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1219.

98.

Id. at 1219-20.
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Estreicher and Menashi point out, under the terms of the deal itself,
while the United States committed itself to “act[ing] ‘pursuant to
Presidential authorities’ to ‘ceas[e] the application of the statutory
nuclear-related sanctions,’” the “European Union also agreed to lift
the sanctions it had imposed, but it adopted implementing legislation
in order to do so.” 99
At the outset, it’s worth noting that unlike in the political sphere,
the Obama Administration “never claimed that [its] decision to
impose or to lift sanctions on a foreign state [was] an area of exclusive
presidential authority.” 100 Rather, President Obama took the position
that “he could lift the sanctions based on congressionally delegated
authority in the existing sanctions legislation.” 101 The problem with
this approach, as Professors Estreicher and Menashi point out, is that
it “contradicts the expressed intent of Congress in the sanctions
statutes.” 102
According to Estreicher and Menashi, the waiver
provisions in those statutes were specifically focused on individual
cases, rather than the “across-the-board,” long-term waivers of the
type contemplated in the deal. 103 Indeed, they argue that contrary to
“act[ing] within the legislative framework established by
Congress….[President
Obama]
essentially
overturned
that
framework.” 104 Even more troubling, Estreicher and Menashi note
that there is little if any historical precedent—save in the narrow area
of claims settlement—for the notion that the President can enter into
non-treaty agreements that have such legislative effects. 105
99.

Estreicher & Menashi, supra note 62, at 1201 nn.2 & 3 (citing JCPOA,
supra note 9, annex V, at 1-2; EUR. UNION EXTERNAL ACTION,
INFORMATION NOTE ON EU SANCTIONS TO BE LIFTED UNDER THE JOINT
COMPREHENSIVE
PLAN
OF
ACTION
(JCPOA)
13
(2016),
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/iran_implementat
ion/information_note_eu _ sanctions _jcpoa_en.pdf [https://perma.cc
/28HM-LRA6]).

100. Estreicher & Menashi, supra note 62, at 1201-02. Of course, as
Estreicher and Menashi note, the Administration probably didn’t make
such a claim because it “would be highly doubtful.” Id.
101. Id. at 1203.
102. Id. at 1204.
103. Id.; see also id. at 1230-41 (examining each of the applicable Iran
sanctions regimes and concluding that the waivers contained therein
were focused on individual exceptions).
104. Id. at 1204.
105. See id. at 1215 (“There is no basis for arguing that a history of
congressional acquiescence has added a ‘historical gloss’ to the
foundational constitutional principle that the executive is not a
lawmaker even when dealing with foreign relations….[Indeed, the]
understanding of the limited, nonlegislative effect of sole executive
agreements has not been disturbed in subsequent practice, with one
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Again, perhaps unsurprisingly, supporters of the JCPOA argue
that the legislative sanctions framework explicitly provided the
President all the authority he needed to carry out the terms of his
political commitment in the Iran Deal. 106 For example, Professor Koh
argues that not only is there “ample domestic legal authority for…the
President to suspend economic sanctions pursuant to waiver authority
provided by Congress,” but that “this [authority] is not just ‘general
preauthorization,’ of the type that one might find in certain types of
congressional-executive
agreements,
“but specific
statutory
authorization of the Youngstown Category One land.” 107 Moreover,
Professor Koh argues that while the Constitution provides Congress
clear authority over foreign commerce, including sanctions, Congress
has “undeniably” delegated the implementation of this authority to
the President and given him specific statutory authority to waive
sanctions in the national interest. 108
On this point the record is perhaps more mixed. To be sure, the
textual waiver authority provided to the President does not admit
any specific temporal or substantive limitations save, in some cases,
certain findings with respect to national security and the requirement
to renew the waivers on a regular basis. 109 So, while Estreicher and
Menashi are right that the structure of the sanctions laws make clear
that Congress intended the typical waivers to be narrow and shortterm, nothing on the face of the law itself prevents the President from
making the type of findings both President Obama and Trump (at
least for the first year) made, and nor does anything prevent any
President from implementing such waivers over and over again for
years to come. On the other hand, what is also clear is that a key
reason for the Administration’s decision to go down the road of using
its existing statutory authority, just like its decision to go down the
political commitment road, was its inability to muster the votes in
Congress to get new authority from Congress to reduce sanctions as
part of the Iran nuclear deal. 110

possible exception: the President’s practice of utilizing executive
agreements to settle claims of Americans against foreign governments.”).
106. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 60, at 353 (asserting that the President has
such authority under domestic law).
107. Id. (emphasis in original).
108. Id. at 353-54.
109. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 8804(g) (2018).
110. See Estreicher & Menashi, supra note 62, at 1202 (indicating that
President Obama could not enact the Iran Nuclear Deal by statute or
treaty because of lack of support from Congress).
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IV. Lessons Learned
So, what might all of this teach a future Administration about
international accords and their stability? One obvious lesson—that
our allies and counterparties have already learned—is that if one is
looking for permanence in an international accord with the United
States, one ought encourage the United States to look for a vehicle
that has at least some measure of interbranch cooperation and, to the
extent you can get it, you want to get a treaty. That much, perhaps,
was obvious from the outset, but the question then becomes what
happens when the executive is faced with a recalcitrant legislature
that prefers additional pressure to a potential deal, as the Obama
Administration was.
The answer is perhaps counterintuitive. The typical reaction of
executive branch officials—as it was in the prior Administration—is
to try to get out from under the thumb of Congress, whether by hook
or by crook. As it turns out, that approach, while perhaps easier in
the short-run, can have the long-term effect of actually sapping the
core authority and legitimacy of a deal. Instead, a wiser path might
have been to include key members of Congress—particularly Senators,
including those of the opposite party from the President—on the
negotiating team. Under such a scenario, if a deal is reached, it
would put a bipartisan group of members on the hook to advocate for
an agreement. That is, taking such an approach would give a future
Administration a group of key players on Capitol Hill with built-in
buy-in for the Administration’s position.
A more limited version of this approach might be to use the
method employed by the Iranians in their negotiations with the
United States: that is, using the legislature as the “bad cop” in the
negotiation. Indeed, repeatedly throughout the negotiation process,
when the deal terms got tough, the Iranians would go to U.S.
negotiators with the old saw that they were under pressure back
home, whether from the Supreme Leader or from the Iranian Majlis. 111
The Iranians would repeatedly exploit this claim—even in the late
hours of the final deal—to extract further concessions from the
P5+1. 112 In stark contrast, the prior Administration regularly stiff111. See generally Ariane Tabatabai, Reading the Nuclear Politics in Tehran,
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.armscontrol
.org/ACT/2015_09/Feature/Reading-the-Nuclear-Politics-inTehran#note12 [https://perma.cc/4UZ3-GZZX] (“The distinction
between rhetoric and policy is crucial in understanding Iranian
intentions and actions.”).
112. See generally Gareth Porter, Behind the Scenes: How the US and Iran
Reached Their Landmark Deal, THE NATION (Sept. 5, 2015),
https://www.thenation.com/article/behind-the-scenes-how-the-us-andiran-reached-their-landmark-deal/
[https://perma.cc/XN4Y-GSQN]
(outlining the timeline of the Iran Nuclear Deal provisions).
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armed Congress, telling the Iranians that the President had all the
authority needed to do the deal on his own and that Congress would
be kept tightly in its lane. 113 This approach, of course, turned
Congress against the President and his deal and, at the same time,
gave away a potential bargaining chip the President might otherwise
have used to improve the deal vis-à-vis the Iranians.
One might argue, however, that a President brings Congress into
a negotiation early at his or her own risk. Namely, one might
reasonably argue that bringing in Congress will simply make a deal
harder to get because members of Congress are likely dig in on
negotiations, sometimes even seeking to undermine the entire effort.
However, as Estreicher and Menashi point out, when responding to
executive action in the foreign affairs arena that exceeds classic
boundaries of the separation of powers, Congress is handicapped by
practical difficulties that make it difficult for Congress to oppose such
action, including the need to obtain supermajorities to overcome a
potential Presidential veto. 114 This is particularly true where, as here,
prior Congressional action appears to provide sufficient authority for
the President to act. 115 Thus, at least in the circumstance facing the
prior Administration, there’s good reason to believe that members of
Congress, knowing it would have been difficult getting engaged
substantively on the Iran issue without the President bringing them
in, might actually appreciate the effort and be good actors—including
as potential “bad cops”—if brought into the process.
Finally, one key element for executive branch negotiators to
consider: if a major international deal cannot get even a bare
majority of political support in either House of Congress, it simply
may not be the right deal to do. Here, the Iran deal was seen—
correctly—as having so many deep-seated flaws, it would have been
hard to catalogue them all. 116 Nonetheless, the prior Administration
113. See generally id.
114. See Estreicher & Menashi, supra note 62, at 1249 (“Recent scholarship
on ‘historical gloss’ and congressional acquiescence to executive action
testing the boundaries of separated powers rightly emphasizes the
practical difficulties Congress faces when trying to act as a unitary body
to resist perceived executive overreach. These logistical barriers are
part of the constitutional design. The President has the advantage of
initiative, both in the foreign relations and domestic spheres. It is
difficult for Congress to pass laws, amend or repeal them, or take other
action as a body to express opposition to executive action. Even when a
course of action enjoys majority support in both houses, that may still
not be enough congressional consensus to override an express or
impliedly threatened veto; this was the dynamic behind the Iranian
Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015.”).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Blaise Misztal, Iran Deal Limits Inspectors’ Access to
Suspicious Sites, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (July 17, 2015),
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barreled forward, ignoring the complaints, committed to the notion
that all those legislators on Capitol Hill (and the American people
they represented) were just wrong and that the deal, properly
understood by the elite P5+1 negotiators, the Secretary of State, and
the President, was, in fact, worth doing. Of course, had the
Administration forced itself to get congressional assent, whether
through the treaty or another process, or had cut key members of
Congress into the process, it likely would have been back at the
negotiating table and might very well have gotten a better deal that
would have been more politically sustainable in the long run.
At the end of the day, the key takeaway from the Iran nuclear
deal experience for all is pretty straightforward: do not do a major
deal that you cannot sell at home. The framers understood this,
having created a system of separated powers for just such deals.
Executive branch officials would be wise to look back to those
constructs going forward.

https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/delayed-inspections-jcpoa-provisionsfor-iaea-access-to-suspicious-sites/
[https://perma.cc/R3VA-4VK2]
(describing key flaws in the Iran deal related to sites with prior military
dimensions).
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